Despite the obvious differences between the USA and UK health care systems, they share the characteristics of being motivated and managed in relation to cost and process rather than quality (the improved health status of patients). Whilst governments and insurers across the world use the rhetoric of quality, they, as epitomized by the behaviours of UK and USA decision makers, fail to define, measure and implement quality outcome policies. These behaviours are examined and some of their causes are explored briefly. Competition, as designed and used in public (e.g. UK National Health Service) and private (e.g. USA managed care) markets is shown to fail both to identify quality outcome targets and to provide evidence-based and efficient mechanisms to motivate decision makers to be orientated towards continuous quality outcome improvement in health care. A central policy challenge is, consequently, not just the measurement of quality outcomes but also their management into practice.
systems why is it that, even now, so little is done to measure market is a means to achieve social goals and is not an end in itself [7] . and to improve quality in a systematic manner? In particular, the effects of competitive mechanisms will be appraised to
The initial documentation [1] failed to set the rules for exchange in the NHS market. The reforms created the ascertain why both the NHS internal market and the USA managed care has, as yet, achieved only modest observable purchaser-provider divide and introduced contracting to govern exchange between those buying and those supplying improvements in the quality of patient care.
health care. However, crucial rules to govern this exchange were not defined [8, 9] . For instance, rules were necessary to determine how prices were to be set, how labour was to be paid and whether NHS providers could borrow capital from
The nature of competition the private market. These rules were slow to emerge and often constrained rather than sustained competitive pressures Competitive behaviour, the striving of actors in the health [10] . care market to improve their power in terms of either
In addition, rules to guide and govern performance (i.e. monetary rewards or other forms of power, exists in all health the pursuit of quality) were needed for the NHS market. care systems, public and private. However, it is usually What did Thatcher's rhetoric of 'value for money' mean? Of associated with markets and the pursuit of profits.
course, politicians like to use appealing but ill-defined terms, Markets are networks of buyers and sellers and their the latter characteristic making accountability to the electorate behaviour is a product of the ways in which they are regulated. much more difficult! Ambiguity of terms confuses the definIt is extraordinary that some, particulary those in the political ition and the implementation of new policies. The ambiguity marketplace and the media, still advocate 'free markets'. No of Thatcher's value-for-money theme can be compared with market has ever been, or ever will be, free. Even in the that of 'evidence-based medicine' (EBM). Are these terms absence of government action, buyers and sellers regulate to do with inputs, processes and outcomes and in what transactions in order to ensure orderly exchange by curbing combination? predatory practices. Coase [6], the market oriented Chicago EBM is a term produced by a profession beleaguered by Nobel Laureate, concluded the following when discussing health care reforms which threatened their power and whose the epitome of the market − the exchanges for stock and members wish to use such techniques to improve the govshares:
ernance of clinical practice. For instance, Sackett et al. [11] argued that: "It is not without significance that these exchanges, often used by economists as example of a perfect market and "Doctors practising evidence-based medicine will identify perfect competition, are markets in which transactions are and apply the most efficacious interventions to maximize highly regulated (and this quite apart from any government the quality and quantity of life for individual patients, this regulation there may be). It suggests, I think, correctly, may raise rather than lower costs." that for anything approaching perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would normally be needed."
As has been argued elsewhere [12] , this emphasis on outcomes (efficacy and/or effectiveness) may lead to decisions which are inefficient and do not give value for money. Thus, whether or not the State owns the means of health For instance, if EBM practitioners could choose between care production, regulation of decision makers is ubiquitous. therapy, which gives health status improvements of 5 years The policy and research issue in public and private markets of healthy life (5 HYs) and therapy Y which gives 10 HYs, is the same: do the regulations, implicit and explicit, in that they would choose the latter. However, if X costs US$1500 market facilitate the achievement of policy goals such as the and Y costs US$7000, the former is more cost-effective as delivery of quality care to patients? it produces a healthy year for US$300, as compared with therapy Y, which produces a healthy year for US$700. Thus therapy Y, relative to therapy X, produces 5 more HYs for an additional US$5500 i.e. the marginal cost of production
Quality and market regulation
of HYs by therapy Y is US$1100. If Thatcher's value-for-money argument is interpreted in The UK case an economic fashion as value in terms of health outcome (HY) for the use of resources (cost), EBM may lead to Decision makers, public and private, design regulatory arrangements which control competitors. What is surprising is inefficiency. Some physicians may argue that their individual ethic requires them to provide all care which is beneficial the naive way in which this regulation is often designed and implemented. Thus, for instance, Thatcher's government regardless of its costs. This ethic is in conflict with the social ethic of the public health physician and the economist who wished to 'redisorganize' the NHS so that competition was introduced into the supply (provider) side of the market. argue that the inefficient treatment of one patient deprives another patient of treatment which gives greater value i.e. They failed to acknowledge, and were slow to learn, that the inefficiency is unethical. Thus, the reluctance of Sackett and pounds to manage its practice better and to improve quality. some other advocates of EBM to incorporate opportunity This system was controlled by the profession and it failed. cost into their management can produce inefficiency. They Clinical governance will bring with it some useful new reargue that 'rationing', i.e. allocating resources on the basis of porting procedures (e.g. CHI's audit of the auditors and the their costs and benefits, is the business of evidence-based Trust Board's monitoring of quality). However these may purchasers and not of physicians who should retain their role prove inadequate if the Colleges deter or slow the institution as the guide and advocate of the patient.
of governance. At present the Government remains reluctant Despite the disagreement about who should ration there to augment their reforms with processes of reaccreditation is, at the level of principle, acceptance of the need for better of individual practitioners. However, with NICE, CHI and measurement of costs and outcomes. For instance, as a result proposed investments in information technology (IT), it may of agitation by researchers and a report of the House of create the conditions for reaccreditation procedures. These Lords in 1988, the English Department of Health created a are long overdue and have been resisted tenaciously by the Research and Development Strategy. This funded the creation profession. To ensure their adoption and the implementation of the Cochrane Centre in Oxford, where Iain Chalmers of continuous quality improvement, the Government will initiated the international Cochrane Collaboration (which is have to exert substantial and continuous pressure on all groups now producing systematic reviews across a wide range of in the labour force so that they become more accountable and therapeutic areas) and the NHS Centre for Reviews and innovative. Such policy, if badly managed, can lose electoral Dissemination in York.
support. However, the use of such data was not enhanced by
In conclusion, the pursuit of quality in the NHS during the use of competition and the NHS internal market. The the last decade has been ill focused and driven by short-term performance rules in this system remained focused on costs political expedients (such as waiting lists and waiting times). and intermediate outcomes. The performance of hospitals These policies may have affected quality (in terms of economic was evaluated by 'finished consultant episodes' of care (FCEs) efficiency) at the margin but this has not been quantified.
[13]. Performance (the efficiency index) was measured by the The new Labour Government has abolished in principle, but volume and rate of growth of FCEs, data that gave no less so in practice, the internal market and has created new indication of whether treatment was effective or appropriate. institutions and incentives whose initial quality focus may be Other policy 'initiatives' focused on waiting times for in-better but whose incentives are unclear and unproved. It patient and out-patient treatments. Elaborate goals were continues to distort resource allocation by a politically driven set, activity was measured and resources targeted at these focus on waiting time/list procedures, some of which are of objectives. Again their achievement or non-achievement did little benefit to patients [15] . Its proposals for performance not reveal efficiency, appropriateness or quality. measurement are mainly process orientated and sometimes With the advent of the new Labour Government, the of ambiguous appropriateness [16] . For instance, the advocacy challenge of translating the rhetoric of concern about quality of increased levels of coronary artery by-pass grafts (CABGs) into substance rather than evasion remains [14] . The Gov-may not be cost-effective if the improved use of statins ernment uses the terms 'clinical effectiveness' and 'cost reduces disease. effectiveness' interchangeably, exhibiting either a desire to Some progress (e.g. the Cochrane initiatives) has been placate the medical profession or confusion about meaning. made in reviewing and extending the evidence base but much It will create a National Institute for Clinical Excellence of this knowledge has yet to be translated into practice (NICE), again confusing medical terminology with economic changes. However, much of this research and development necessity (cost effectiveness). There will also be a Commission has been focused on the appraisal of clinical practice in for Health Improvement (CHI) which will act both as a 'hit well-designed trials. This is very useful but needs to be squad' and a systematic reviewer of providers' performance. complemented by research and development investment in Discussion of NICE and the CHI emphasizes guidelines and service organization and delivery. The result of investment protocols but ignores the extent to which such guidelines in this area would increase knowledge of how institutions and protocols that exist are evidence-based, i.e. they contain can be induced to gather and use knowledge about evidenceclinical but not cost-effectiveness data.
based practice and policy. The failure of the Department of An emphasis of the latest NHS White Paper is 'clinical Health to invest in this area demonstrates both medical governance' and quality, with the definition of the latter domination of its research and development programme and becoming better in some parts of the proposals. It seems reluctance to recognize that knowledge about service delivery that there is greater political awareness of the quality issue. issues is of crucial importance in identifying appropriate However the new proposals offer relatively few incentives incentive structures to induce practitioners to improve the to ensure its effective pursuit other than command and quality of the care they deliver. control rules which may not be evidence based.
The Government expresses a preference for professional self-regulation (e.g. by the Royal Colleges) even though this The USA case has failed in the past. For instance the Thatcher reforms
The efforts of the Clinton administration to reform the included the funding of medical, later clinical audit by which the medical profession was allocated hundreds of millions of USA health care system were largely targeted at cost containment and failed due to complexity and the investment
The main reason for this is perverse incentives, in particular the absence of risk rating. If, for instance, a of the insurance industry in anti-Government advertising. The response of the private sector was to recognize the managed care company has a good programme for HIV-AIDS or the treatment of angina with CABGs, it public disquiet about cost escalation and to develop crude mechanisms of expenditure control which focused on must proceed with caution. Such data will attract new customers many of whom may be bad risks. The expense inputs and processes, in particular input costs and process volumes.
of treating such patients in the absence of risk-related premiums can drive a managed care company out of These regulatory devices consumed large expenditures. To compete for market share by advertising, to administer business. By the year 2000 Medicare premiums will be risk rated and these data techniques may facilitate premium controls affecting a broad range of provider activities and to inform those control systems with information, required adjustment in the private sector. Without this, competition based on outcome quality will be risky and muted. managed care companies to invest in excess of 20% of their expenditure in these aspects of 'non-patient care'
The National Committee for Quality Assurance measures and publishes 'comparative information on the quality of activity.
The companies devised 'guidelines' and 'norms' which care' [21] from what it calls its Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set. Whilst this is a useful first step were used as benchmarks to judge the performance of providers and to reduce medical practice variation. Patient in that it standardizes measures and reports the extent of independent audit of returns, it fails to provide extensive choice and clinical freedom were constrained in a very un-American way by the use of second opinions and a quality outcome measures. This is surprising as, for instance, quality of life measures have been used in research for variety of bureaucratic checks which obstructed access to care. Primary care was developed using both nurse prac-several decades e.g. Short Form 36 (SF-36) was derived from an instrument used in the 1970s in the Rand Health titioners and general physicians to act as gatekeepers to the secondary care system. Purchasers bargained aggressively Insurance experiment and is now well validated and available in over a dozen languages [22] . Despite the and selectively to drive down the prices of pharmaceuticals, hospital beds and professionals.
existence and experimental use of SF-36 and a range of other generic and specific quality of life instruments, the The efforts of the purchasers to hold down total expenditure were remarkably successful but have required managers of managed care firms in the USA (and their equivalents in the UK and elsewhere) have largely ignored increasing investment as 'the fruit on the lower part of the tree of economy' were gathered in over the last 5 them as a means of identifying, measuring and managing quality. This occurs despite the availability of patientyears. During the recent past (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) health care expenditure as a percentage of USA Gross Domestic friendly access and electronic analysis of patients' responses.
However, there are developments in the quality area Product (GDP) has been held at 13.6%; although GDP, and hence health care expenditure, rose in this period [17] . which are encouraging. For instance, in Pennsylvania the era of 'scorecard' cardiovascular medicine has been However, there are signs that this is a temporary success: recently Kaiser premium rates in California rose by 11% implemented [23] . This system reports on mortality after heart attacks. It has been introduced with great care with and the profits accruing to commercial managed care firms are now very low [18] . participant hospitals being given time to develop appropriate risk adjustment methods and data validation techniques. The causes of this reversal of trends are a nice combination of provider and consumer reaction. There The focus of this initiative is to create standardized data systems and this Pennsylvania example demonstrates 'our have been many consumer complaints, some merited and some unmerited, about access to care. For instance vigorous potential to compare medical outcomes and identify the best practices' [23, p. 986] . Such systems have also been criticism by womens' groups of the time permitted in hospital after confinements led the Federal Government developed elsewhere in the USA, e.g. California.
For such developments to be extended, considerable to legislate that all mothers had the right to 48 hours of hospital stay [19] . Such legal intrusion into the design of investment in data capture and analysis is unavoidable.
Managed care firms recognize that this will be as expensive the benefit programme of managed care plans and other Congressional intrusions into clinical practice has led to as it is unavoidable because, once risk-rating problems are mitigated, a company which lags behind market trends professional concerns about their 'endangered integrity' [20] . may lose comparative advantage and concede its market share to its rivals. Successful outcome quality data are Gradually this has led to a clearer focus on quality and outcomes. The performance management of managed care likely to be a powerful mechanism, if validated, in winning new customers and identifying those providers with which companies in the USA are remarkably crude and overly focused on inputs and processes. It might be expected a company does or does not wish to contract, provided premiums are risk related. that the market orientated USA health care system would measure quality if only to use this to compete for market Thus the managed care 'revolution' has been rather disappointing because of its failure, until recently, to focus share. In fact the managed care 'revolution' has largely ignored quality and outcome and competed on price and on, manage and market its products on the basis of outcome quality. The American marketplace, like that of volume.
UK-NHS, remains badly informed about outcomes because outcome quality be managed into health care choices and investment made in appropriate IT and management systems. so-called competition has led to price, cost and activity management with little focus on quality in terms of survival adjusted for quality of life [24] .
